Fiscal capacity and executive constraints in early modern Europe

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Henriques A., KARAMAN K. K., Palma N.

Public Choice, 2026 (SSCI, Scopus) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Basım Tarihi: 2026
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1007/s11127-025-01372-4
  • Dergi Adı: Public Choice
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus, IBZ Online, ABI/INFORM, EconLit, Political Science Complete, Public Affairs Index, Urban Studies Abstracts
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: Historical political economy, Executive constraints, State capacity, Fiscal capacity, Government efficiency, Checks and balances
  • Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

According to the prevailing view of Europe’s political history, constrained government and state capacity developed in tandem. In this study, we reevaluate this perspective by constructing new historical indices for executive constraints and fiscal capacity. Our findings challenge the presumed connection, illustrating that high-capacity states existed under unconstrained government, and low-capacity states existed under constrained regimes. We also identify what made England historically distinctive: its political system stood out for combining constrained government with high fiscal capacity. This rare combination helps explain the eventual take-off of modern economic growth in England.