Does violent conflict affect the distribution of social welfare? Evidence from India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
Social Policy and Administration, cilt.57, sa.5, ss.656-678, 2023 (SSCI, Scopus)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Cilt numarası: 57 Sayı: 5
- Basım Tarihi: 2023
- Doi Numarası: 10.1111/spol.12899
- Dergi Adı: Social Policy and Administration
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus, Academic Search Premier, International Bibliography of Social Sciences, Periodicals Index Online, Business Source Elite, Business Source Premier, Geobase, Index Islamicus, PAIS International, Political Science Complete, Social services abstracts, Sociological abstracts, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.656-678
- Anahtar Kelimeler: anti-poverty program, contentious politics, India, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, Maoism, social policy
- Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
What are the contentious political dynamics of the largest workfare program in the world, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) of India? Combining quantitative analysis with a close reading of government documents and a survey of the existing literature, we suggest that the Indian government's counter-insurgency strategy against the Maoist unrest is a significant dynamic shaping the distribution of MGNREGA benefits. In our empirical analysis, we examine the effect of Maoist incidents on household income due to MGNREGA by merging a nationally representative household survey (Indian Human Development Survey-II) and a Maoist incidents dataset. Controlling for relevant household and district characteristics, we show that higher intensity of violent conflicts is associated with higher MGNREGA benefits. This result is robust to using a variety of alternative specifications and estimation methodologies.