Knowing wrongly: An obvious oxymoron, or a threat for the alleged universality of epistemological analyses?
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, cilt.11, sa.33, ss.305-321, 2011 (Scopus)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Cilt numarası: 11 Sayı: 33
- Basım Tarihi: 2011
- Dergi Adı: Croatian Journal of Philosophy
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Scopus
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.305-321
- Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about "false knowledge" or "knowing wrongly." There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person's knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of "knowing wrongly" in Turkish. Then, taking Allan Hazlett's recent account of the gap between traditional analyses of knowledge and actual epistemic practices of real cognitive agents as a point of departure, we spell out a non-universalist and non-extensionalist perspective on the value of "knowing wrongly.".